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Sheathing the Sword: Augustine and the Good Judge
In this article, I offer a reading of City of God 19.6 that is
newly consonant with Augustine’s message to real judges.
Often read as a suggestion that torture and execution are
judicially necessary, I argue that 19.6 actually calls such
necessities into question, though this is not its primary
purpose: first and foremost, 19.6 is an indictment of Stoic
apatheia. Situating 19.6 within Augustine’s larger polemic
against the Stoics, I find that it presents the Stoic judge as a
man who lacks fellow feeling, and therefore, has only a
parodic happiness: costly to himself and those he judges. A
new look at Augustine’s letters to judges confirms this
reading, and shows that, for Augustine, the man of
humanitas is the true model for the good judge, not the man
of apatheia.
Keywords: Augustine, Stoicism, judicial ethics, apatheia,
humanitas, capital punishment.
Introduction
On September 29th, 2015 the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles denied a last
minute plea for clemency in the capital case of Kelly Gissendaner, a woman who had
conspired with her lover to murder her husband in 1997 (Connor, Shepherd and Gutierrez
2015). By her own admission, Gissendaner entered prison a “self-centered and bitter
person,” but now, her supporters said, Gissendaner was a changed woman, and deeply
remorseful for her crime (Casey and Bennett 2015, 3). Alongside pastors, prison staff,
and members of the public, these supporters included her once estranged children, as well
as fellow inmates, who recounted how Gissendaner helped transform their lives (Casey
and Bennett 2015, 45-8, 17-28). As her execution date loomed, they began to write,
petition, and call the parole board, petitioning for clemency on Gissendaner’s behalf
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(Connor, Shepherd and Gutierrez 2015).1 They also used media and social media to
spread the word about her case, such that it even caught the attention of Pope Francis,
who echoed their plea for clemency—a plea ultimately denied. The first woman to be
executed in Georgia in 70 years, Gissendaner touched the hearts of many who dared to
hope that September 29th, 2015 would end with something other than an execution.
Though they did not manage to shake the judgment of the parole board, in arguing
for clemency on the grounds of her rehabilitation, her advocates tapped into an ancient
argument against capital punishment: that of St. Augustine’s. Perhaps this is surprising,
given that Augustine’s intervention in capital cases are not well known. Yet, his efforts to
temper the violent judicial culture of his day, mainly through letter writing, are worth
recovering as we debate the role of the death penalty in contemporary American society.
Looking at his letters to Christian judges, we discover a compelling case as to why
punishments ought to be ordered towards rehabilitation, and why this emphasis should
give the judge pause in sentencing anyone to death.
However, if we are to bring this aspect of Augustine’s episcopal activity to light,
we must first address the reputation that has obscured it. This reputation is rooted in a
Her counsel’s application for clemency included, among others, the following
justifications: that she accepted responsibility for her actions and was deeply remorseful
for her crime, that she earned the “support and respect” of the staff and volunteers at her
correctional facility “as a result of her positive impact” on those around her, and that she
displayed “a commitment to seeking redemption through spiritual growth and serving
others” (Casey and Bennett 2015, 2). I highlight these to indicate that three of the chief
arguments made on her behalf were on the grounds of her transformation. By presenting
Gissendaner as rehabilitated to such an extent that “the person she was no longer exists,”
her legal counsel appealed to the idea that punishment is ultimately ordered towards
rehabilitation; on this reasoning, if there was any case in which the parole board ought to
“exercise its power to bestow mercy,” it was in case like hers (Casey and Bennett 2015,
53). In this way, the Gissendaner appeal foreshadows the major claim undergirding
Augustine’s appeals for clemency, namely that “punishing and pardoning are done well
only in order to correct the life of human beings” (EP=Augustine 2003, 153.19).
1
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certain reading of City of God 19.6: Augustine’s so-called meditation on the wise judge.
Here, Augustine describes a judge who does not find it ‘an “unthinkable horror” that
innocent witnesses are tortured in cases in which they are not accused, or that prisoners
should be driven to make false confessions through torture…’ (Parrish 2005, 232). 2
According to the predominant reading, Augustine admires this judge (Parrish 2005, 232–
235; Markus 1970, 99–100; Niebuhr 1995, 124–5; Burnell 1995, 40; Deane 1995, 64;
Scott 1995, 153; and Rist 1996, 215). In my reading, it is the Stoics who do: the
predominant interpretation conflates Augustine’s voice with the Stoic voice.
Reading 19.6 in context, a larger difficulty with the predominant interpretation
also emerges. It mistakes the purpose of the passage and, indeed, of book 19 as a whole.
19.6 has repeatedly been interpreted as a passage about judicial ethics, often in a way that
stretches to political ethics more broadly. To many, it seems to advocate a politics of
necessity (Deane 1963; Markus 1970; Niebuhr 1995; Burnell 1995; Kaufman 2007;
2009). John Parrish summarizes this perspective well, arguing that Augustine highlights
“the opacity of human moral existence” in order to show that our fallibility “requires and
excuses the brutality of our actions” (2005, 233).
However, I find it difficult to attribute such an opinion to Augustine for two
reasons. First, Augustine’s goal in book 19 is not to communicate a theory of political
necessity, but to challenge “the arguments advanced by mortals in their efforts to create
happiness for themselves in the midst of the unhappiness of this life” (CD=Augustine

See, especially, the first footnote in Kaufman, where he notes that “the problem most
cited in studies of such tensions [that is, the difficulties faced by Christian public
servants] is that of Christian magistrates obliged to torture witnesses as well as the
accused to get to the truth. Augustine counsels judges to bear with the system yet to pray
for their deliverance from its more onerous and morally dubious tasks” (2010, 701).
2
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1998, 19.1).3 The vignette in which the judge appears, like the others that surround it, is
chosen precisely for its ability to do this. The difficulties the judge faces are not grounds
for sweeping claims about Augustine’s abandonment of politics to the blunt instruments
of necessity; they are signs of the inescapability of suffering.
Second, because of the way Augustine is demonstrating the inescapability of
suffering in book 19, it is difficult to claim that he brings up the judge to excuse his use
of violence. In fact, this claim would go against an important thread in Augustine’s
argument, namely, his criticism of Stoic apatheia in 19.4-7.4 While Augustine approves
of true apatheia, which he has already defined as “a life without those emotions which
arise contrary to reason,” he thinks this kind of apatheia is impossible in this life (CD
14.9). The Stoic attempt to force apatheia, he argues, leads them to feign it—to turn
apatheia into the suppression of emotion per se. For Augustine, such a suppression of
emotion is tantamount to a loss of one’s humanity (humanitas). Thus, when he brings up
the judge in 19.6, his goal is to question the quality of happiness that Stoic apatheia
yields, and his strategy is to problematize the judge’s serene prescription of torture and
execution. Thus, at the end of the chapter, we find him reflecting,
…[i]t would be more compassionate and more worthy of
the dignity of man if he were to acknowledge that the
3

Of course, the other side of the coin to this argument is that his also showing what it
means to live in hope. In this way, his criticism is ultimately ordered towards his
construal of the Christian vision of pilgrimage, which increasingly takes central stage as
book 19 progresses. While this aspect of book 19 is worth exploring, and perhaps even
sheds light on certain facets of 19.6, the goal of this paper is to focus on Augustine’s
criticism of Stoic apatheia insofar as it reveals the impossibility of the conventional
reading of the passage, and then to inform our understanding of Augustinian judicial
ethics by examining his letter to judges.
4 There is a long-standing debate as to whether Augustine really understands the Stoic
position. Richard Sorabji, for one, has argued that he does not (2003, 372–84). Rist and
Byers disagree (Rist 1996; Byers 2012 and 2013).
4

necessity of acting in this way is a miserable one: if he
hated his own part in it, and, if, with the knowledge of
godliness, he cried out to God, ‘From my necessities
deliver Thou me’ (CD 19.6).
Having re-interpreted City of God 19.6, in the second half of the article, I will turn
to Augustine’s correspondences with Roman judges. It is in these letters, I argue, that we
find Augustine’s explicit position on the good judge: the good judge does what he can to
avoid torturing and executing those he tries. Examining Augustine’s letters, what we find
is a constant exhortation to humanitas, which he associates with the recollection of our
own humanity and the humanity of others.5
What is more, in reading Augustine’s letters, it becomes clear that, for Augustine,
the man of humanitas is the true model for the good judge, and not the man of apatheia.
Though apatheia was celebrated by Stoic judicial culture as a way to mitigate the judge’s
tendency towards anger, Augustine contended that it has a severe flaw: it left no room for
compassionate discretion. As long as judges remained rooted in a Stoic conception of
duty, Augustine would face an uphill battle in his efforts to plead for mercy: it would
always seem like he was asking them to neglect their duty. Thus, in order to make room
for mercy in justice, Augustine had to reframe judicial duty in light of a new ideal.
Thus, one letter at a time, Augustine embarked on the work of persuading judges
to think of their duty in a new light. Though his primary concern was always the
particular case at hand, it is clear that Augustine also aspired to reach the judicial world
more broadly. As we will see, he took strategic advantage of his most prominent
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For Augustine, humanitas in its fullness is always associated with caritas, the form of
true virtue (CD 14.9). While he does praise pre-Christian figures for displaying
humanitas, he also believes that it is Christ who shows us what human nature really is,
and our participation in Christ that restores and heals this nature.
5

interlocutor’s status to spell out his case for humanitas most fully. In disseminating his
new judicial ideal through this letter and others, Augustine did not ask judges to “bear
with the system,” as Peter Kaufman has suggested, but gave them a reason to limit their
use of torture and execution (2010, 701).

Contextualizing the Just Judge Passage
Before we look at Augustine’s letters to judges, we must first do the work of
rehabilitating City of God 19.6. To do this, it is necessary to read the passage in context.
As Augustine explains in many places, the City of God can be split into two volumes—
the first, primarily a critique of the pagan worldview; and the second, primarily a defense
of the Christian worldview [Augustine 1989, EP 1A*; 1998, 10.32, 11.1, 18.1; 2004, EP
184A; 2010, 2.43(70)]. Augustine achieves the latter by documenting the origins,
progress and ends of the two cities, the earthly and the heavenly, over the course of the
last twelve books. Book 19 holds an interesting place in this arrangement. In one sense, it
is about the progress of the two cities, analyzing, as it does, life in the saeculum. Yet,
Augustine does not characterize it in this way. He categorizes it as the first book on the
ends of the two cities (CD 19.1). For our purposes, this categorization is important
because it highlights the very tension that divides the two cities: the dispute as to where
the end, or telos, of human life actually lies. If Augustine thinks that the earthly city
‘immanentizes the eschaton,’ as Voegelin puts it, then book 19 is where he comes to meet
the defensores of the earthly city on their own terms. It is where he asks the world’s
philosophers: can you really be happy here?
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Turning to the internal structure of book 19, we see that Augustine’s goal is to
contrast the “hollow realities” of those who have endeavored to “create happiness for
themselves amidst the unhappiness of this life” with the hope that “will be fulfilled in the
true blessedness which He [God] will bestow on us” (CD 19.1). Below, we will see
Augustine present the judge’s happiness as one of these hollow realities. First, he listens
in on the debates of those who “have made the pursuit of wisdom their profession in the
midst of the vanity of this world”—that is, the philosophers (CD 19.1).
Entering their world, we hear that philosophy is the pursuit of the Supreme Good.
It is a way of life ordered towards happiness.6 The question that divides the philosophers
is what this happiness actually is, and what way of life promotes it. Augustine
demonstrates his grasp of the intricacies of these debates by reiterating Varro’s
categorization of the nearly three hundred philosophical sects. From within, their
disagreements seem monumental. Is the beata vita active or contemplative? Can we have
certain knowledge of the Supreme Good or only probable knowledge? Is virtue the whole
of happiness or merely a part? What kind of part?
Stepping back from these debates, Augustine suggests with Varro that philosophy
actually only gives three possible answers to the question of the Supreme Good: the
human being, made up of body and soul, must either find happiness in the goods of the
soul or the body, or both—either in virtue or pleasure, or both. According to Varro, the
answer can really only be that we are happy if we have virtue, and happier still if we have
other good things as well. Augustine also seems to endorse this as the common sense
solution to the puzzle; if virtue is the good without which other things cannot be truly
6

To my mind, Hadot is the greatest expert on the Hellenistic experience of philosophy as
a way of life (1995; 2002).
7

good for us, virtue is the prerequisite for whatever happiness we have. Other goods only
add to it.
However, Varro’s position only stands if we take his presuppositions as our own,
which Augustine does not. Over and against the philosophers’ project of looking
inward—to qualities of soul and satisfactions of body, Augustine looks upwards—
towards the divine gift of eternal life. For Augustine, the truly Supreme Good is eternal
beatitude. From the perspective of the debate we have just heard, this answer comes out
of left field. It is supposed to feel this way: Augustine has intentionally structured his
inquiry so that his readers experience a dramatic shift in perspective. What was, until a
moment ago, common sense is now called into question.
For the philosophers of Augustine’s day, the entire pursuit of philosophy was
wrapped up in the idea of a happy wise man. He was the goal to which they aspired; he
was whom they wished to be. Here, Augustine uses their preoccupation with the wise
man to ask whether any human being can really be satisfied in this world: “…is there any
pain, any disquiet…that cannot befall a wise man’s body?” Deformity, ruin, sickness,
weariness, lethargy: “…is there any of these which may not assault the flesh of the wise
man?” (CD 19.4). If Augustine can have his readers admit that even the wise man suffers,
then he has shown that true happiness lies beyond this life.
I have already suggested that 19.6 is best read as part of an ongoing polemic
against Stoic apatheia; now, we are in a position to see why. Augustine’s goal in the first
chapters of book 19 is to call the philosophers’ summum bonum into question, and he
does this by presenting the happy wise man as the product of perniciously wishful
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thinking. Because the Stoics go farther than any other school in defending the complete
happiness of the wise man, they are, as it were, low hanging fruit:
They believe that their wise man, that is, he whom, in their
amazing vanity, they describe as such, even if he becomes
blind, deaf and dumb; even if he is enfeebled in limb and
tormented with pain; even if he falls victim to every other
ill that can be described or imagined; even if he is
compelled to put himself to death: that such a man would
not shrink from calling a life, beset with such ills, a happy
one! (CD 19.4).
The Stoics, in other words, believe that the wise man is perfectly happy, not only when
he undergoes extreme pain at the hands of others, but even when he takes his own life!
Calling the Stoics shameless for making such claims, Augustine spends the next few
chapters working out the tragic consequences of their position.
First, Augustine challenges the Stoic conceptions of virtue and evil [nefas].
Essentially, Augustine thinks, the reason why the Stoics are able to maintain that their
wise man is always happy is that they only recognize moral evils as evil. Virtue, they say,
protects their wise man from this kind of evil, and therefore, from unhappiness. His
wisdom protects him from mistaking bodily pains for true evils, while his temperance,
fortitude, and justice protect him from committing the moral evils that would rightly
sadden him.7 Not so, Augustine retorts. In this life, virtues can only help people endure
suffering; they cannot protect people from it—and sufferings really are evils.
Lambasting the Stoics for exalting a sham virtue that promises too much,
Augustine begins to build a case as to why such this false promise is so dangerous. In
doing so, Augustine taps back into an idea that he began developing back in book 14.
7

For scholarship on the concept of nefas in Stoic philosophy see Long 1968 and
Christopher 2010. For an excellent summary treatment of Stoic ethics on its own terms,
see Annas 2007.
9

There, he argued that while true apatheia will follow upon the peace of the saints, the
only apatheia that this life can offer is a parody. Rather than avoiding irrational emotions,
those who seem to have achieved this blessed state have actually rendered themselves
unfeeling: they “are not stirred or excited or swayed or influenced by any emotions at all”
(CD 14.9). How are they able to achieve such an un-human state? They are, he says,
“entranced by their own self-restraint” (CD 14.9). This, he warns, is a parodic peace of
mind, and everything parodic comes at a cost. It yields an “entire loss of humanity
[humanitatem]” instead of “true tranquility” (CD 14.9).8
Carrying this critique of apatheia into book 19, Augustine strives to show that a
virtue bound up with it is incompatible with a robust social life. Oliver O’Donovan has
also noted this, writing that “Augustine seizes on the social question” in order to
highlight the inadequacy of the wise man’s “solitary pursuit of his own happiness” (1999,
111). The Stoic wise man, Augustine will contend, claims he can be happy anywhere
because his happiness is divorced from the fate of others. He has constructed a protective
shell around himself. Organizing the next three chapters around the Stoic division of
society into the household (19.5), the city (19.6), and the world (19.7), Augustine
presents the Stoic wise man as an alienated figure, incapable of empathy (Hughes 2005,
148).
Beginning with the household, Augustine asks, can anyone really be happy here?
Examining the possibility of finding happiness in our closest relationships, Augustine
8

Peace (tranquilitas) is arguably one of the most important themes of book 19 and
undeniably sheds light on the ultimate purpose of 19.6. By presenting the tranquilitas of
the Stoic wise man as a state only achieved by the suppression of his humanity,
Augustine prepares the reader to see why earthly peace must be ordered towards
heavenly peace if it is not to become parodic. Augustine develops his theory of peace
throughout book 19, but most especially in chapters 11-14 and 27.
10

reminds us that those we love also have the most power to hurt us. Posturing himself as a
man of compassion, Augustine writes that he hears of such evils with a “great sorrow of
heart [magno dolore cordis]” (1995a/CD 19.5). Folding the standard Stoic objections into
his analysis—the wise man can bear any ill with equanimity; the wise man is prudent
enough to avoid taking up with the wicked—Augustine insists that, even with these
caveats, the question remains: does the wise man feel anguish at the treachery of others?9
If so, he cannot be happy; if not, he cannot be good:
…even if someone is strong enough to bear these ills with
equanimity, or vigilant enough to guard against the malice
of false friendship with foresight and prudence,
nonetheless, if he is a good man, he cannot but be
grievously pained [grauiter excrutietur] by the perfidy of
wicked men…” (1995a/CD 19.5).10
In book 14, Augustine has already supplied his answer: if the wise man had sin, he would
grieve, but, the Stoics say, since he is “neither subject to sin, for which he might have
repented and grieved, nor to any other evil which it might grieve him to undergo or
endure…[he] cannot experience such grief” (CD 14.8). There is, it seems, a glaring
absence in the Stoic account: if sins are evil, why does the wise man not grieve for the
sins of another?11 Surely this is a failure on his part. Harkening back to his earlier

9

We should note that in 19.5, Augustine chooses his example with care (contrasting the
“sweetness” of a friendship that was “reckoned genuine” with the bitter discovery that it
was “in fact only a clever pretense”) (CD 19.5). False friends are not the only ones being
accused of pretense here: the Stoics also are. What is more, insofar as the Stoic wise man
has the characteristics the Stoics exalt, it is not clear that he can be a true friend in
Augustine’s eyes.
10 1995a refers to the Latin from the Corpus Augustinianum Gissense.
11 Byers makes a parallel argument in her discussion of City of God 9.5, writing that
Augustine thinks that the Stoics “hold an arbitrary distinction between the virtue of others
and the virtue that is one’s own” (2012,134).
11

allegation that the seemingly equanimous build a shell around themselves, Augustine
presents the solitary happiness of the wise man as, indeed, inadequate.
Having failed to find genuine peace and happiness in the household, Augustine
turns to the city. Unsurprisingly, there is less peace here. The city’s forum is “filled with
civil law-suits and criminal trials” (CD 19.5).12 As Brent Shaw explains, the courtroom
drama was “arguably the quintessential civic experience” in the late Roman Empire, so it
is fitting that Augustine zeroes in on the judge as the quintessential public figure (2003,
535). The same limitation that tainted the judge’s personal life, we now find, also plagues
his public life: he is still vulnerable to betrayal and deception. He still cannot penetrate
people’s consciences.13 On top of this, he may well convict the innocent. Augustine
thinks that this is—or rather, should be—distressing.

Interpreting the Just Judge Passage
As we begin to scrutinize 19.6, it is worth recalling the claim I am at pains to
refute: the idea that Augustine thinks sin “requires and excuses” the brutality of Roman
legal practices (Parrish 2005, 233). I have already suggested that I do not think 19.6 is an
apology for the politics of necessity. If anything, it calls predominant views on judicial
necessity into question. Therefore, in this section, I will first treat 19.6 in terms of
Augustine’s immediate goal, which is to present the wise man’s happiness as parodic.
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Legal historian Jill Harries writes that much of the law in the late empire was
“concerned with how the state regulated disputes between its citizens and punished those
who offended against social norms” (1999, 99).
13 All this is said against the background of Augustine’s theory of communication, in
which logos and self-disclosure are deeply intertwined. The human ability to
communicate the truth about ourselves is an important part of what constitutes the imago
Dei in human beings.
12

Following this, I will examine what the passage implies about Augustine’s own views on
necessity.
Perhaps the reason why 19.6 poses so much difficulty for the modern reader is
that Augustine never explicitly mentions the Stoics in it. Indeed, in asking whether this
judge can bear to take his seat with so little assurance that his judgment is correct,
Augustine does not spell out whose judge he is discussing. While Bettenson misleadingly
translates the passage as asking whether “our wise man [will] take his seat” (Augustine
1972, 19.6), Augustine merely mentions ‘the’ wise man [ille sapiens] (1995a, 19.6).
Yet, context makes a strong case that the judge in question is a Stoic. Not only is
Augustine in the process of engaging with the Stoics, but his readers would have
associated the judge with Stoicism; it was their philosophy, of all the philosophies, that
most influenced judicial culture (Thorsteinsson 2010, 13).
In order to get a better sense of the Stoic judicial culture that Augustine is
addressing in 19.6, it is helpful to consider the following excerpt by Susanna Braund:
According to orthodox Stoic belief, punishment was a
matter of applying strictly the penalty decreed by law, with
no room for discretion in either direction. The ancient
evidence is unequivocal, for example (Diogenes Laertius
7.123=SVF iii.640): “They [the Stoics] say that the good
man is not lenient, for the lenient man is critical of a
punishment that is deserved; and they identify being lenient
with assuming that the punishments fixed by law are too
harsh for wrongdoers and with thinking that the law-giver
is distributing punishments contrary to what is deserved…”
(Braund 2009, 66-7).

13

For the Stoics, justice was the punishment of crime, and the judge’s duty was to
administer the law’s penalties with strict precision;14 this is why Augustine’s fictitious
judge approves of citizens who want to benefit society by “ensuring that crimes do not go
unpunished” (CD 19.6). This attitude towards law and order was deeply linked with the
Stoic vision of who the judge ought to be: a civically-engaged wise man who “would
disdain emotional turbulence and grand rhetorical bombast, but still lead through his
trained wisdom” (Inabinet 2011, 16). In short, the Stoics celebrated a judge who could
remain stalwart and composed, regardless of the suffering around him.
Yet, will the wise judge take his seat? Returning to Augustine’s question with this
in mind, we can begin to guess how Augustine wants the drama to play out. He will
rehearse his case as to the judge’s plight, and the judge will remain unmoved by it, just as
he must remain unmoved in every case. Augustine will argue that the judge’s situation is
to be “greatly lamented” and even “bathed in a fountain of tears,” and the Stoic will
respond that “the wise judge does not act in this way through a wish to do harm” (CD
19.6).15 This, as a re-affirmation of the judge’s happiness, should appear to miss the
point. It is far too abstract.

That said, Seneca’s views do “run counter to the conventional, hard-line Stoic
position” on this point (Braund 2012, 93; cf. Byers 2012, 135-7). In De Clementia,
Seneca argues that clemency, the capacity to dispense with legal precisions when the
principles of justice had been satisfied, is a virtue (Byers 2012, 135). Compassion,
however, remains suspect, even in his modified Stoicism; as an emotion, it undermines
apatheia and therefore, clear thinking about justice.
15 While in a number of English translations, the one who reflects is the “philosopher,” in
the Latin critical edition, Augustine does not actually refer to philosophers in 19.6 at all.
Here, he merely writes, “haec tot et tanta mala non deputat esse peccata; non enim haec
facit sapiens iudex nocendi uoluntate, sed necessitate nesciendi, et tamen, quia cogit
humana societas, necessitate etiam iudicandi” (1995a, 19.6). In this way, it is unclear
whether Augustine is addressing a Stoic philosopher who analyzes the wise judge from
without, or a Stoic judge who imitates the wise judge, and thereby takes him as his point
14

14

Enacting this drama, Augustine presents the judge’s self-assessment:
He does not think it a wickedness [nefas] that innocent
witnesses should be tortured… or that the accused… are so
often overcome by such great pain that they make false
confessions…Nor does he think it a wickedness [etsi] that,
… they very often die under torture or as a result of
torture… [italics mine] (1995a/CD 19.6).
In having the wise judge pass over such terrible tragedies unmoved, Augustine depicts his
thought process as clinical, harsh. He seems to have reduced his entire consideration of
evil [nefas] to a consideration of his own sin. By rooting his happiness in his own moral
rectitude, he thinks, as long as I apply the law with precision, I am doing my duty, and
am, therefore, happy. Perhaps not.
Moreover, by inverting the classic Stoic scenario, Augustine brilliantly
accentuates the wise man’s terrible alienation. Here, the wise man is not happy while
being tortured or as he is putting himself to death, he is happy while he is imposing
torture on another and putting another to death. The judge of 19.6 may not “wish to do
harm,” but he clearly has rendered himself unable to acknowledge the suffering of others
(CD 19.6). He cannot call upon his pity because he has suppressed it, and he cannot call
upon his reason because it is entirely focused on own interior state.16 In the end, 19.6
means to leave us with the terrible sense that Stoic happiness has been bought at a high
price. While Stoicism may allow the judge to take his seat with equanimity, it is only
because he has abstracted himself from the tragedy that surrounds him.
of departure in considering his own situation. Regardless, the Stoic judge/philosopher and
the wise judge blend into each other, likely suggesting that the wise man is the Stoic’s
idealization of himself, and that the Stoic easily conflates himself with his ideal.
16 Susanna Braund writes in her introduction to Seneca’s De Clementia that although
Stoic morality values “justice and equity and respect for one’s fellow human beings on
the basis of our shared humanity,” it puts the greatest emphasis on “an individual’s
internal moral state” (Seneca 2009, 9).
15

In the preceding section, I have argued that 19.6 belongs most proximately to a
tri-partite argument designed to show that Stoic apatheia hardens the wise man to
suffering instead of making him truly happy. Looking to the home (19.5), the city (19.6)
and the world (19.7), Augustine attempts to convince his readers that no human can
escape suffering without cost, even the wise man. Having seen the wise man in his home
life, we have now also seen him in his public life: as judge. “…[C]ompelled to seek the
truth by torturing innocent people,” yet, never quite sure that he avoided executing the
innocent, Augustine wants to ask, can this judge really be happy (CD 19.6)?
Nevertheless, it is the case that Augustine thinks it necessary for the judge to take
his seat.17 Therefore, we must examine whether Augustine thinks that necessity “requires
and excuses” the judge’s use of torture and execution (Parrish 2005, 233). While
Augustine does not outright condemn the Stoic judge for committing an injustice, this
does not mean that he is simply excusing the judge’s use of torture and execution.18
Rather, I will argue, Augustine’s indictment of Stoic apatheia calls the very terms in
which the Stoics think about necessity into question. While Stoics have an unquestioning
attitude towards necessity, considering it the judge’s duty to apply the law with
exactitude, Augustine strongly objects to this attitude, writing:
…It would be more compassionate and more worthy of the
dignity of man if he were to acknowledge that the necessity
Perhaps one can turn to Augustine’s correspondence with Boniface in which he
explains how one can be at once a soldier and a Christian to work out the logic Augustine
is following here (EP 189). It may be true that it would be anachronistic to claim that
Augustine saw torture as always and everywhere wrong. As Jill Harries puts it in her
commentary on letters 133-4, “Nowhere, in this extended reflection on the injustice of the
quaestio, does Augustine object to the infliction of pain as a matter of principle. His
argument seems to leave open the option that, if it could be guaranteed that torture would
be inflicted only on the guilty, this could be acceptable” (Harries 1999, 133).
18 I would like to thank Nicholas Ogle for helping me clarify this point in my argument.
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of acting in this way is a miserable one: if he hated his own
part in it, and, if, with the knowledge of godliness, he cried
out to God, ‘From my necessities deliver Thou me’ (CD
19.6).19
What we must determine, therefore, is whether this new attitude towards judicial duty
ultimately leads to a different outcome.
From this passage alone, we might be tempted to conclude that Augustine thinks
that the difference between the good judge and the Stoic judge is merely his ability to
grieve. Michael Walzer interprets City of God 19.7 to be saying something of this effect
with regards to war. He writes:
Augustine did not believe that it was wrong to kill in a just
war; it was just sad, or the sort of thing a good man would
be saddened by (Walzer 1973, 167).
If Walzer is right, then we would be right to conclude that Augustine does not think
torture or execution wrong, but only sad. Augustine’s judge would always make the same
choices as the Stoic wise man. His compassion would be fruitless. What is more, if
Walzer is right, then Parrish is also right: Augustine still thinks necessity requires and
excuses the standard judicial use of torture and execution.
In order to resolve this problem, we must look at 19.7 for ourselves. Here,
Augustine is still in conversation with the Stoics, this time about world peace. Walzer is
not alone in taking this passage as an apology for just war; many have (Langan 1984; Epp
Weaver 2001; Syse 2012; Kellison 2015). Yet, reading it as a continuation of the
19

As one of my reviewers astutely noted, another important thread in Augustine’s
argument is his message to Christian readers: those who already believe that this world is
not their home. In book 19, Augustine does go to some lengths to point out that
Christians can and should invest in their political community. They should not abandon
it. For this reason, it is significant that Augustine’s praying judge does also take his seat.
Augustine’s point, as we will see in his letters, is that there is a way to do one’s civic duty
with humanitas.
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argument we have already been exploring, a different interpretation emerges: the Stoic
wise man cannot be genuinely happy as friend, judge, or general. He is always
surrounded by tragedy; he just fails to acknowledge it. By now we should notice the
pattern in Augustine’s approach. Grieving over the bloody cost of the Pax Romana,
Augustine punctures his own impassioned lament with the cool logic of the Stoic voice:
“But the wise man will wage just wars” (CD 19.7). Again, the Stoics appear unfeeling,
abstract. If their wise man only “remembers that he is a human being,” Augustine retorts,
“he will be much readier to deplore the fact that he is under the necessity of waging even
just wars” (CD 19.7).
Here, we see that 19.7 rounds out the point Augustine has been making since
19.4, namely that we suffer, in no small part, because we are social—and that we can
only protect ourselves from suffering by becoming less social. 20 In this way, 19.4-7
prepares us to make a choice: we must either accept the grief that comes with real
relationships, or we must “prohibit and extinguish affection” and “with ruthless
disregard, sever the ties of all companionship…” (CD 19.8). The Stoics have chosen the
latter, but at great cost.21 In stifling the pain that comes with others’ sins, sufferings, and
failures, they have aspired, not to true happiness, but to a sort of amputation of
consciousness. The one who can think about the evils of war without anguish, Augustine

“…By nature the most social creature, and by fault, the most discordant” (CD 12.28).
It is not, however, as though the Stoics think of themselves as having done this. In fact
their philosophy puts great emphasis on friendship and civic harmony. What Augustine is
pointing out is that their resistance to mercy undercuts their verbal acknowledgment of
friendship as a good (Dodaro 2000, 245; Gregory 2008, 276, 83, 87–91).
20
21
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concludes, “thinks himself happy only because he has lost all human feeling [se putat
beatum, quia et humanum perdidit sensum]” (1995a/CD 19.7).22
With this reading in mind, we can ask, is Walzer right? Walzer’s claim could be
tenable, if not for the way Augustine presents compassion [misericordia] in 9.5. Having
just recounted Aulus Gellius’ tale about a rough sea voyage taken with a famous Stoic
philosopher, Augustine remarks how much better it would have been for the Stoic to have
been “disturbed by compassion for a fellow man,” so that he could “comfort him…” (CD
9.4). While Gellius’ Stoic gave a quick-witted defense of his pallor (which was merely
bodily) during the storm, it is clear that Augustine thinks the energy he spent maintaining
his mental composure could have been better used.
Calling Cicero’s praise of Caesar’s compassion “far better and more humane
[humanius]” than the Stoic praise of equanimity, Augustine goes on to highlights the
importance compassion has in motivating human beings to humane action. Calling it “a
kind of fellow-feeling [compassio] in our hearts,” Augustine explains how this feeling
draws our attention to another person’s “misery” in a way that “compels us to help him if
we can” (1995a/CD 9.5). In this way, compassion acts as helper to right reason, moving
us to consider how we can best alleviate another’s suffering. Here we find the answer to
our question; if Augustine’s “melancholy soldier” really does hate the fact that he is
under the necessity of waging war, he will not rest in the satisfaction that the war is just

Here again, Augustine alludes to his earlier suggestion that those who “are not stirred
or excited or swayed or influenced by any emotions at all” achieve an “entire loss of
humanity [humanitatem]” instead of “true tranquility” (CD 14.9).
22
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(Walzer 1973, 167).23 Instead, he will actively look for ways to alleviate suffering, and,
importantly, he will avoid causing unnecessary harm.
Having established that Augustine praises compassion for its ability to move us to
humane action, we can ask what this implies about the judge who also hates necessity.24
Perhaps the most important piece of evidence that Augustine’s compassion yields a fresh
perspective on necessity is his assessment of torture. As Jill Harries has noted, there was
a longstanding belief in Roman culture that only torture guaranteed truth (1999, 123).
Indeed, centuries earlier, Seneca describes the role of torture in the Roman judicial
system from a Stoic point of view:
Our judicial procedure is a spectacle that surrounds itself
with fiery torches, iron chains, and the claws of wild
animals…So it isn’t surprising, is it, that there is such a
great fear of all this process in which there is such
wonderful variety…The torturer does not have to do much
more than simply set out the instruments of pain. The
defendants are mentally overcome…In fact, the instruments
with which the tortures subjugate and dominate our minds
are more efficient to the precise degree that they are simply
displayed (Seneca, Epistle 14.2 in Shaw 2003, 539).
Seneca is not troubled by the role torture plays in the Roman judicial procedure. In fact,
he finds it salutary because it intimidates the weak-minded and, therefore, lends itself to

23

Joseph Clair has made a similar argument based on a close reading of letter 229 to
Darius, writing, “This letter suggests that virtuous military officials have a responsibility
to try to avoid the necessities of war and bloodshed that is not altogether unlike the call to
avoid capital punishment that Augustine urges upon Macedonius” (2010, 102).
24 As we will see below, in his letters to judges, Augustine continues to affirm the
necessity of the judge’s duty, but reinterprets this duty through the lens of humanitas. The
practical upshot of this is that torture and execution are no longer necessary (cf. Clair
2016, 100).
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the judge’s discovery of the truth. 25 Because the Stoics associate weak-mindedness with
vice, they condone the pageantry of violence; it helps to terrify criminals into confessing.
Yet, in 19.6, Augustine breaks with this cultural truism by suggesting that
Stoicism itself advises people to make a false confession. He writes, “if the accused has
followed the wisdom of our philosopher friends in choosing to escape rather than endure
those tortures any longer, he confesses to a crime he has not committed” (CD 19.6). If
this is true of the Stoic, how much more true is it of everyone else? If most people are
likely to say whatever is necessary to stop the pain, torture may not help the judge
discover the truth at all.26 As we will see below, Augustine takes this doubt as grounds
for caution, writing counseling one judge it is not humane to impose “certain punishment
for uncertain” crimes (EP 153.20). In the end, the judge’s uncertainty is not, pace Parrish,
a good reason to use torture, but a good reason to avoid it. In this way, we gain a glimpse
into how Augustine’s compassion will yield a critical attitude towards judicial necessity,
and will help him reexamine the status quo.
Here, I have argued that a contextualized reading of City of God 19.6 gives us
sufficient grounds to part ways with the idea that necessity requires and excuses brutality.
Having explored what it would mean for Augustine’s judge to hate the necessity he is
under, we can conclude that there is a significant difference between the social
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Augustine explores Stoic views on weak-mindedness in book 9 of the City of God. The
Stoics, he argues, think that the difference between the weak-minded [stulti] and the wise
man [sapiens] is precisely that the mind of the former “yields to … passions and adapts
itself to them, whereas the wise man, though he experiences them of necessity,
nonetheless retains with mind unshaken a true and steadfast perception of those things
which he ought rationally to seek or to avoid” (1995a/CD 9.4).
26 As we will see below, this is not Augustine’s only reservation when it comes to torture.
He is also worried about the torture of innocents, stressing that it is not humane to impose
“certain punishment for uncertain” crimes (EP 153.20).
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implications of the Stoic commitment to apatheia and those of Augustine’s commitment
to humanitas, grounded in caritas. Simply put, the judge who is compassionate will look
for ways to alleviate suffering, and will avoid causing unnecessary harm. The one who is
not will not. This cannot but make a difference in outcomes.

A Fuller Picture of Humanitas: Augustine’s Intercessory Letters to Judges
In the introduction, I suggested that the City of God 19.6 only hints at Augustine’s
views on judicial ethics and that he only lays them out explicitly in his correspondence
with judges. While we do not have access to every letter, we do have a remarkable
volume for a premodern figure, and one, I would suggest, that yields a remarkably
consistent emphasis on humanitas. Reflecting on this set of letters, Robert Dodaro writes
that “one is struck by how much of his political activism is largely focused on the defense
of persons accused or convicted of crimes” (2005, 106). Dodaro is right. Augustine is
constantly writing letters to intercede for such persons, whether they be poor tenantfarmers exploited by their landlords, stewards convicted of heinous crimes, riotous
Donatists, or violent Circumcellions.27 While these letters do not make for conclusive
evidence that Augustine tried to revolutionize judicial culture per se, they do make for
compelling evidence that he did what he could to move real judges towards clemency. 28

27

Cf. inter alia eps. 14*, 15*, 91, 100, 104, 133, 134, 138, 151, 153, 247. What John
Matthews wrote of Symmachus’ letter writing is equally true of Augustine’s: “his aim
was the pursuit and cultivation of amicitia: and his letters were primarily intended not to
inform but to manipulate, to produce results” 1974, 64. Cited by Ebbeler 2007, 230.
28 In his own way, even Kaufman admits this, writing that though Augustine does not
think the political world will ever improve such that it will be free of corruption,
Augustine does his part to help the victims of corruption (2009, 54). Moreover,
Augustine has a number of letters and sermons that corroborate Augustine’s activity as
intercessor, but none that undermine it. As he writes to Nectarius in letter 91: “We try to
22

Before we turn to these letters, it is helpful to pause on a certain sermon that
foreshadows their message and suggests why Augustine places such emphasis on letter
writing in the first place. In this sermon, we find Augustine admonishing his
congregation for having lynched a corrupt soldier:
…you vent your rage on him to the point of death. And
what about after death, where none of your punishment
now reaches that bad man, and only the malice of another
bad man is finding expression? That’s mindless madness,
not avenging justice (Augustine 1994, sermo. 302.2).
Going through the list of grievances they had against the soldier, Augustine highlights the
degree to which his parishioners forget their own guilt in emphasizing his. This, he
thinks, is a dangerous tendency must be mitigated by humanitas. Later, he will tell a
judge the same thing. He will also add that “it is easy and natural to hate evil persons
because they are evil, but it is rare and holy to love those same persons because they are
human beings” (EP 153.3). Hatred for criminals, Augustine stresses, is not justice.
In fact, he tells his parishioners, the judicial system exists because human beings
have a tendency to judge their enemies too harshly. While the people “vent their rage” on
their enemies, the judge is “compelled” by his office to “unsheathe the sword”, though
“he would prefer not to strike” (Augustine 1994, sermo. 302.16). Here, we glimpse a new
kind of judge; this is a judge who prefers not to strike. He is not neutral. Like the Stoic
judge, he is compelled by a duty to uphold the law, but unlike the Stoic judge, his refusal
to hate the criminal is grounded in something other than apatheia.

observe this norm unconditionally so that no one is punished by a more severe penalty,
either by us or, at our intercession, by anyone else.” (Augustine 2001, EP 91.7). Cf.
Dodaro 2000, 232–3.
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Finally, Augustine argues, instead of judging the deceased soldier, his
parishioners ought to “feel pity” for him [dolere ergo ad vos pertineat, fratres mei, dolere
ergo ad vos pertineat, non saeuire] (Augustine 1994/1995a, sermo. 302.18). Again, this
pity ought to inspire action; it should lead them to do everything in their power to prevent
vigilante justice:
I am not saying, brothers and sisters, that any of you can go
out and just tell the populace to stop; that's something not
even I can do. But each one of you in his own house can
prevent his son, his slave, his friend, his neighbor, his
apprentice, his ward from taking part. Work on them so that
they don’t do these things. Persuade those you can; and be
firm and severe with others, over whom you have
authority…(Augustine 1994, sermo. 302.19).29
Significantly, the action Augustine has in mind is the work of persuasion. What increases
the power of persuasion, Augustine thinks, is the influence that comes from social bonds.
He, as a bishop, has this kind of influence with his flock, just as his parishioners might
have it with their family and friends. If Augustine thinks that social ties are the privileged
avenues for cultivating humanitas, we can see why Augustine considers it his duty as a
bishop to write letters to Christian judges.

29Augustine’s

relationship to slavery is perhaps as complicated as his relationship to
judicial authority. One thinks of 19.15 of the City of God, where Augustine urges that, if
it is not possible for one to free his slaves, that he treat them well, emphasizing that the
paterfamilias has a greater responsibility to care for his slaves than they do to obey him.
Elsewhere, we find Augustine working to stop the slave trade in Africa, calling for
Alypius to bring the problem to the attention of the Imperial Court in Ravenna (EP 10*)
and using his own powers as a judge to hear cases where loopholes in Roman law might
allow for the liberation of some slaves (EP 24*). That said, Augustine was not an
abolitionist. Discussing this, Dodaro writes that though Augustine “often drew from his
church’s treasury in order to purchase the freedom of slaves,” he sometimes thought it
better for slaves to remain as such, given the economic conditions of the time and the
difficulty of paying taxes. (2005, 102)
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Turning to the first of our letters, we find Augustine congratulating the newlyminted Proconsul of Africa, Donatus, on his posting. Rejoicing that the Catholic Donatus
is someone with whom he has clout, Augustine explains that his pleasure at having a
fellow Catholic in office is not what the Proconsul might think.30 Writing at the height of
the Donatist controversy in 408, Donatus might imagine that his position should be used
to punish the Donatists. Yet, Augustine actually writes to temper Donatus’ severity: the
Catholic bishops, he explains, “do not seek vengeance” upon their enemies (Augustine,
2003, EP 100.1). Fearing that Donatus might judge the Donatists “in accord with the
immensity of their crimes” rather than “in accord with…Christian gentleness,” Augustine
begs him to “forget” that he has the power to take life at all (EP 100.2). Consonant with
his advice above, Augustine makes sure to invoke his authority as a bishop:
…if you think that human beings should be put to death for
these crimes, you will make us afraid that something of the
sort might come to your court by means of our effort. And
once this has been discovered, those people will roam about
seeking our destruction with greater audacity since we will
be compelled to choose even to be killed by them rather
than to denounce them to your courts to be put to death…
That is, if Donatus is too harsh on the Donatists, the bishops will not cooperate with him,
and this will undermine his authority as the new Proconsul.

30

As recently as a decade ago, there was a consensus that, in the Donatist controversy,
Augustine had succumbed to the temptation of using torture and political power to coerce
people into the Church, paving the way for the inquisition (von Heyking 2001, 222). For
von Heyking’s challenge to this narrative, see pages 222-57. He also notes that
Augustine’s famous change of mind on prosecuting the Donatists occurs in 408,
contemporaneous with or before the letters we are studying were written (2001, 235-9).
Gregory, citing epistle 187, also notes that Augustine was always firm that “Christian
gentleness” must be maintained and that capital punishment never be imposed (2008,
297–306).
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Three years later, we find Augustine penning a similar letter to Marcellinus, the
Imperial Commissioner to North Africa. Again, the question on the table is Donatist
violence. Again, he writes of his fears: “[A] very great worry has come over me that Your
Eminence might perhaps judge that they should be punished with such great severity of
the laws that they suffer the sort of punishments they inflicted” (EP 133.1). It is not that
he wants to “prevent criminals from losing the freedom to commit crimes,”—rule of law,
after all, is necessary—it is that he wants to prevent inhumane applications of the law.
Over and against the Stoic paradigm in which “punishment was a matter of applying
strictly the penalty decreed by law, with no room for discretion…” (Braund 2009, 67),
Augustine presents a different paradigm: for the law to be upheld in a humane fashion, it
must leave the convict “alive and with no part of the body mutilated” (EP 133.1).
Significantly, the Christian Marcellinus already has chosen to be creative in how
he applies the law so that he might avoid torture. By choosing to extract the Donatists’
confession through the kinds of tactics used by “teachers of the liberal arts …parents”
and even bishops, he has already demonstrated his humanitas (EP 133.2). However,
Marcellinus has yet to sentence these Donatists, and Augustine worries that the pressure
to punish with severity might still overtake him. To strengthen him, Augustine exhorts
Marcellinus to remain firm in his humanitas:
Let the power to punish, therefore, not make you harsh,
since the need to carry out an inquiry did not banish your
gentleness. Do not, now that the crime has been discovered,
look for an executioner, since in its discovery you were
unwilling to use a torturer.
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Again, we see Augustine providing his judge with an alternative to Stoicism: like the
Stoic judge, Marcellinus is to avoid acting on revenge. Unlike the Stoic judge, he is to
avoid it by remembering to be humane:
Carry out, O Christian judge, the duty of a loving father. Be
angry at wickedness in such a way that you remember to be
humane [ut consulere humanitati memineris], and do not
turn the desire for revenge upon the atrocities of sinners,
but apply the will to heal to the wounds of sinners. Do not
undo your fatherly diligence that you preserved in the
inquiry when you obtained their confession of such great
crimes not by limbs stretched upon the rack, not by iron
claws furrowing the flesh, not by burning with flames, but
by a beating from rods (1995a/EP 133.2).
In this passage, we also glimpse how Augustine is thinking about humanitas: to
remember to be humane is to “heal the wounds of sinners” (EP 133.2). In encouraging
Marcellinus to posture himself as a loving father, Augustine redirects Marcellinus’ focus
towards the person behind the crime and gives him a reason to mitigate the severity of the
law. Just as a father seeks the true good of his son, so Marcellinus should seek the true
good of the criminal. As before, Augustine ends his letter by invoking his authority as a
bishop: a son of the Church, Marcellinus would do well to heed his counsel.
Next, we encounter Augustine writing to African Proconsul, Apringius, also in
411, but this time regarding the Circumcellions.31 Knowing that their sentencing would
fall under his jurisdiction, Augustine echoes the same plea we have already heard.
Fearing that Apringius may condemn them to death, he begs as a Christian that this not

Regarding the violence of the Circumcellion rebellion, Augustine writes, “[t]hey not
only beat us with clubs and kill us with the sword, but they have also thought up an
incredible crime and hurl lime mixed with acid into our eyes in order to put them out.
Moreover, they pillage our homes, and they fashion for themselves huge and terrifying
weapons. And armed with them, they run off in different directions, threatening and
breathing slaughter, robbery, fires, and blindness.” (Augustine 2001, EP 88.8).
31
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happen, and warns as a bishop that it had better not happen (EP 134.3). If he were writing
to a non-Christian judge, Augustine explains, he would take a different approach, but
would plead for mercy just the same. On human grounds, he could at least say that the
victims’ suffering would only be “marred” by more spilling of blood (EP 134.3). Yet, for
a son of the Church like Apringius, it should be enough that Augustine exhorts him as a
bishop. Again we see Augustine using his clout to promote clemency.
Turning lastly to Augustine’s 414 correspondence with Macedonius, we should
begin by noting how rare it is that Augustine writes to such an important political figure;
Macedonius was the highest-ranking Roman official in Africa. Accordingly, it is not
surprising that that there is an abundance of scholarship on this exchange (Lamoreaux
1995; Raikas 1997; Kaufman 2003; Dodaro 2005; Clair 2016; Humfress 2011). What is
surprising is that so little has been said about the importance of humanitas in the first of
Augustine’s responses to him.32 Indeed, as Joseph Clair notes, “what is most striking in
Letter 153 is Augustine’s continuous appeal to Macedonius’ humanity, the humanity of
the criminal, the fellowship of humanity that exists between them, and the role that
Augustine assumes this shared sense of humanity will play in Macedonius’ decision”
(2016, 95). Though Clair does not develop this thought in great detail, much can be
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That is, this is the first extant response. From letter 152, it is clear that Augustine has
already written to him. With regards to the importance of humanitas in this letter:
Augustine uses cognates of humanitas or inhumanitas in EP 153 8 times (though there
are 19 references to the human, a not unrelated fact). He also speaks of the attribute of
humanity in letters 17.2, 22.9, 33.6, 82.1, 87.1, 114, 133.2 171a.1, 204.3 and 266.1. In
these letters, the meanings range from a reference to a general reputation of kindness or
friendliness, to a particular, and perhaps more serious virtue: the disposition of
humaneness through which a person recognizes the fellow humanity of others and
responds accordingly.
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gleaned from letter 153 as to why humanitas is ultimately the ground of Augustine’s
appeal for clemency (cf. 2016, 100).
Perhaps the reason why Augustine took so much time to flesh out his vision of
humanitas to this particular judge is that he knew that the letter would be widely read by
magistrates across North Africa (Ebbeler 2012, 19). Indeed, Augustine indicates as much
himself (EP 153.26). What is more, Macedonius also gave him the perfect prompt: he
asked why the bishops insist on interceding in criminal trials. Does this not make them
“accomplices in guilt?” (EP 153.1). If Macedonius thought that Augustine’s intercession
amounts to an endorsement of criminality, such that any judge who would fold in the face
of his pleas would be failing in his office, he held a view of justice in which the good
judge is the one who cannot be moved. Like the Stoics, he believed that “an act of mercy
involved failure to impose a justly deserved penalty and therefore was itself less than
just” (Braund 2009, 60).
For Augustine, this is an un-Christian idea, and, the reason why Macedonius was
“deeply in doubt” that Christianity justified the bishop’s intervention was because he had
not really applied Christian principles to his understanding of the judicial office—there
was an older account in the air, and he had not broken free from it (EP 153.1). What is at
stake in letter 153, then, is whether or not Christianity can replace the Stoic foundations
of the Roman judicial culture. Over and against the Stoic vision, in which mercy is
“based upon an emotional impulse” and is “therefore undesirable or even reprehensible”
Augustine presents one in which the good judge allows himself to be moved by the
intercessor towards benevolence (Braund 2009, 60). In this vision, mercy and justice are
complimentary; the intercessor and judge work together for the good of society.
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Pushing back against the accusation that he condones laxity, Augustine assures
Macedonius that he believes in law and order. Yet, even if “the power of the sovereign,
the judge’s right over life and death, the executioner’s instruments of torture, the
weapons of the soldier, the discipline of the ruler, and the severity of a good father,” were
all instituted for a reason, they have their limits (EP 153.16). Namely, they must be
limited by humanitas. Here, Augustine employs a historical argument. While the severity
of the punishments in the Old Testament showed that “punishments were rightly
instituted,” now that the world has been “taught to pardon,” things have changed. It no
longer “counts as a failure in their office” if judges “act mercifully…towards those over
whom they have the legitimate power of death” (EP 153.17). Instead, it is Christ-like to
do so.
For Augustine, one of the central implications of the Incarnation is that the mercy
we have received must be passed on. Indeed, he reminds Macedonius, the only reason
there are any “good people” is that God has been “merciful to sinners” (EP 153.26).
Accordingly, the Christian judge must reconceive his duty in light of God’s mercy
towards him:
Since, then, God has such great patience and such great
mercy for sinners that, if they have corrected their conduct
in this life, they are not condemned for eternity, though
God does not look for mercy to be shown him from anyone,
since no one is more happy, no one more powerful, and no
one more just than he, how should we human beings
behave toward other human beings? (EP 153.8)
If God perseveres in patience so that human beings might repent, how much more should
Christian judges do the same?
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What is more, presenting Christ as the truly just judge, Augustine reminds
Macedonius that when he spoke to the women caught in adultery, he did not condemn
her, even though he could have condemned her with “full justice” (EP 153.15). Through
Christ, Augustine presents a new rule: the freer from sin a person is, the more merciful he
or she is. The more displeased by sin a person is, the less he or she wants the sinner to
perish “without having been corrected” (EP 153.3). Here is Augustine’s response to the
allegation that the one who spares the guilty approves of their sin.
Reinterpreting the judicial office in this light, Augustine’s counsel is twofold.
First, he encourages Macedonius to imitate God’s patience by allowing criminals time to
change. Second, he encourages him to extend Christ’s forgiveness to criminals so that
they might have occasion to change. Lest this seem too idealistic, Augustine stresses that
he is not asking Macedonius to ignore justice, nor is he asking him to expect criminals
always to change—“Who can fail to know that many have misused this leniency and
gentleness to their own destruction?” (EP 153.4). What he is asking is that Macedonius
hope for this change.
Practically, what Augustine is asking Macedonius to do is to prioritize
rehabilitation over retribution. Macedonius, like Marcellinus before him, is to reconceive
his commitment to justice in terms of discipline. Again, Augustine draws the connection
between the good father and the good judge, this time making its implication clear:
discipline “should not be carried to the point of death in order that the person may still
live who may benefit from it” (EP 153.17). If we were to summarize Augustine’s position
in one quote, it would be that “punishing and pardoning are done well only in order to
correct the life of human beings” (EP 153.19). If Macedonius is to reconceive of his
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office in this way, Augustine promises, he will be acting “as a companion not in injustice
[iniquitatis],” but “in humanity [humanitatis]” (1995a/EP 153.3).
By suggesting that the judge who listens to the intercessor is not weak, but
humane, Augustine, moreover, makes room for his own voice in the judge’s decisionmaking process. Having presented the good father as a model for the Christian judge to
follow, Augustine reminds Macedonius of the gap between the father’s natural love for
his son and the judge’s supernatural love for the criminal: “it is easy and natural to hate
evil persons because they are evil, but it is rare and holy to love those same persons
because they are human beings” (EP 153.3). That judge has to work to keep the humanity
of the condemned in view, and for this, he should be glad of the intercessor’s help.
Thus, in response to Macedonius’ allegation that bishops interfere in the judicial
process, Augustine manages to argue that they are actually indispensible to it. Reminding
Macedonius of the many structural reasons that can cause a judge to “lose his humanity,”
Augustine shows how important it is that the bishops help preserve the humanity of the
judge (EP 153.20, 19). First, because of his status, it is very easy for the judge to imagine
that he already is good and, therefore, licensed to condemn another. It becomes easy to
begin thinking of criminals as “the very worst kind of human beings for whom the
remedy of repentance is absolutely useless” (EP 153.20). Augustine warns Macedonius
that he hears this tendency in his suggestion that criminals only ever pretend to be
remorseful.
While it would be wrong, Augustine admits, to intercede for someone whom he
knows is lying, it is also wrong to presume that all criminals are lying. By reminding the
judge that he is only a human being, and has as much capacity to be deceived as anyone
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else, Augustine seeks to mitigate Macedonius’ presumption. He is as likely to be taken in
by the prosecution as the intercessor is by the defendant: sometimes, the unbelievable is
true and the believable false. Often, money and power taint the judge’s judgment. When a
landlord brings a case against a tenant, for example, whose word and character are
usually trusted in court?
In fact, Augustine reminds Macedonius, the whole legal system is filled with
injustices that are tolerated by custom:
What shall I say about the interest that the laws and the
judges themselves command to be repaid? Or is he more
cruel who steals or snatches something from a wealthy man
than he who ruins a poor person through usury? (EP
153.25)
If debtors are considered criminal, questions remain as to why they required loans in the
first place. Why are we supposed to restore the property of another that was taken
secretly by theft, but not the property obtained by deceiving the judge? These
discrepancies make the bishops’ intercession all the more necessary.
One could say, then, the role of the intercessor is to remind the judge that his
situation is also not as black and white as he thinks. Expressing concern that the judicial
world can too easily split the world into the innocent and the guilty, Augustine reminds
Macedonius that God does not divide the world into the good and the evil, but “calls the
same people evil on account of the sins of human weakness whom he calls good on
account of their participation in divine grace…” (EP 153.13). Thus, in order to break
down the division between the just and the unjust that seems so visible along the lines of
criminality, Augustine shifts the focus from criminality to sin:
… we, though not criminals, often intercede even for
criminals, and… we, though sinners, intercede for sinners,
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… and I think that you understand that we said truthfully
rather than insultingly that we intercede before sinners. (EP
153.15)
By helping Macedonius see that he is one sinner with the provisional authority to correct
another sinner, Augustine makes room for him to judge from a place of humanitas. It is
only by putting himself back on the same level as the one he judges that Macedonius can
he really act out of an awareness of his humanity, the criminal’s humanity, and “the
fellowship of humanity that exists between them” (Claire 2016, 95).
Practically speaking, Augustine explains, the central way that the intercessor
“breaks down the indignation of the prosecutor and the rigor of the judge” is by
reminding them of their “common weakness” (EP 153.10). Here again, Augustine
invokes Christ’s example. Not only did Christ exhort his followers to love their enemies,
he also gave them a reason to forgive other sinners. Supposing that the husband of the
adulterous woman had been present at her stoning, Augustine imagines how he would
have been “filled with fear” upon being reminded of his own sins, so that he would have
“turned his mind away from the desire for vengeance to the will to pardon” (EP 153.9).
By reminding the judge and the prosecution that they are not without sin—even if the law
does not accuse them—the intercessor breaks the illusion that they are the just standing in
judgment on the unjust.
Finally, Augustine explains how the intercessor can step in when a judge, who
wants to be humane, is put in a difficult position. Returning to the case of the debtor who
claims he cannot pay, Augustine explains the judge’s bind. Though he might believe the
debtor, the judge is obligated by law to torture him as long as the plaintiff demands it. If
he wants to be humane, he cannot uphold the law, but if he is to fulfill his office, he must
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uphold the law. This is where the intercessor steps in. Writing that it is more appropriate
for the bishops “to intercede with those who are seeking a return of their money rather
than with the judges,” Augustine explains how the bishops use their authority to urge
plaintiffs to be merciful, stressing it would be better for them lose money than to “torture
or kill [the debtor] if he does not” (EP 153.20). In a system stacked against mercy, the
intercessor is vital. He helps the humane judge “maintain his integrity” (EP 153.20).
Through this series of letters, we have seen how Augustine considers humanitas
to be the lynchpin in his appeal for clemency. His perennial exhortation was this: “Spare
the evil, O good man. Be gentler the better you are. Become humbler in piety to the
extent you are higher in power…Let nothing be done cruelly, nothing inhumanely” (EP
153.19). In arguing for humanitas, Augustine liberated judges from the antinomies of a
Stoic mindset, bringing mercy and justice together in the humane work of correcting
human beings.

Conclusion
To summarize our study, we have seen that Augustine cannot be the promoter of
judicial apatheia he is reputed to be. Instead, we have seen, he is a constant promoter of
humanitas. Despite this, we can still ask whether Augustine is guilty of a failure of
imagination in not imagining a justice system without torture and execution.33 However,
Augustine did not even need to imagine this: he was a part of it. 34 As Peter Brown has

For a treatment of Augustine’s own activity as an agent for social change, see Dodaro
2005. For an alternative reading, see Kaufman 2009.
34 Since the days of the early Church, Christians had taken seriously Paul’s command that
they not take their cases to the secular court, but settle them within their own community
(1 Cor. 6:4-6; Brown 2001). This was the practice that, by Augustine’s time, developed
33
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explained, by the fourth and fifth century Rome, bishops had become “agents of change,”
providing new avenues of advocacy for the poor (Brown 2001, 8).35 Significantly, the
Bishop’s Court (Audientia Episcopalis) did not used torture or collect the ‘tips’
(sportulae) that were customary in the secular courts.36 What is more, during Augustine’s
lifetime, the decisions of this court could not be appealed (Lamoreaux 1995, 147).37 This
was in contrast to the costly procedure in the courts of secular judges, whose decisions
could be appealed (and billed) until they reached the court of the emperor—Rome’s iudex
maximus (cf. EP 138.25).38 Together, these factors made the bishop’s court incredibly
popular, and not only among Christians (Augustine 1989, EP 8*).39 The Bishop’s Court
was an alternative justice system that strove to operate on the principle of humanitas.
Yet, in the end, what is most important about Augustine’s contribution to Rome’s
judicial culture is the vision he sought to share. Like the supporters of Kelly Gissendaner,
Augustine saw punishment as fundamentally ordered towards rehabilitation. By

into the Audientia Episcopalis. Though its practices grew up organically and separately
from imperial procedure (Harries and Wood 1993; Harries 1999; Humfress 2007;
Humfress 2011), in 318 Constantine incorporated it into the Roman system such that the
secular authorities had to enforce its decisions.
35 See also Harries 1999, 97.
36 Lamoreaux 1995, 151. Cf. EP 133.2 in which Augustine writes that in the episcopal
courts, corporal punishment is limited to the use of rods also used by parents and
teachers. This is drastically different than the methods of secular torturers.
37 Under Roman law, it had long been the case that people could opt into having a bishop
as arbiter in a civil suit, just as they might agree to have any respected citizen mediate
their dispute according to the Roman law.
38 As Harries explains, secular judges in the “court of first resort” were usually the
provincial governors (praesides) or the proconsuls (consulares), though sometimes, small
claims cases were delegated to deputies (1999, 53–4).
39 Augustine 1989, EP 8*, The Fathers of the Church, a New Translation: Letters 1*-29*,
trans. Robert B. Eno, vol. VI, (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1989).
In this letter, Augustine discussing how a Jewish man, Licinius, would likely bring his
interlocutor to the bishop’s court over a land dispute if Augustine cannot convince him
that he has, in fact, swindled Licinius out of property.
36

grounding good judgment in humanitas rather than apatheia, he helped Christian judges
reconceive their judicial duty, and, importantly, made room for compassion. Far from
finding an Augustine who abandons judicial culture to necessity, in these letters, and
even in City of God, I would argue that we find an Augustine who did a great deal to
mitigate the violence of Roman judicial culture—and, in ways from which we, too, can
learn.
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